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The rise of political contestation over European integration has led many scholars to examine the role 
that broader ideological positions play in structuring party attitudes towards European integration. 
This article extends the existing approaches in two important ways: 1) It shows that whether the 
dimensionality of politics is imagined in a one dimensional ‘general left-right’ form or a two 
dimensional ‘economic left-right/social liberal-conservative’ form leads to very different 
understandings of the way ideology has structured attitudes towards European integration, with the 
two dimensional approach offering greater explanatory power. 2) Existing approaches have modelled 
the influence of ideology on attitudes towards European integration as a static process. This article 
shows that the relationship between ideology and European integration has changed substantially 
over the history of European integration: divisions over social issues have replaced economic concerns 
as the main driver of party attitudes towards European integration.    
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For much of its history, the process of European integration seemed to be marked by a general 
consensus in favour of continued integration amongst both political elites and citizens. As many have 
noted, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1992 referendum appeared to mark an end 
to this period, ushering in a new phase of protest and public opposition to European integration and 
an increase in conflict between and within political parties over EU policy (Down and Wilson 2008; 
Hobolt 2006; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Scholars have been divided over the extent that this 
increased politicisation has impacted national political parties and party competition in EU member-
states (Carrubba 2001; Evans 1999; Evans 2002; Mair 2000). Gradually a consensus has emerged that 
although European integration has yet to play a major role in domestic electoral competition, it has 
become a ‘sleeping giant’ that could become an important electoral issue in the future (van der Eijk 
and Franklin 2004; de Vries 2007).  
In response to these developments, a great deal of research has sought to explain the origins and 
structure of conflict over European integration between political parties. A consistent empirical 
finding has been the so-called ‘inverted-U’ pattern: when politics is envisaged as occurring in a two 
dimensional space with a general left-right dimension and a European integration dimension, party 
support for European integration is highest among parties at the centre of the left-right spectrum and 
lowest at both extremes (Aspinwall 2002; Hix and Lord 1997; 2002; Marks 2004; Marks, Wilson, and 
Ray 2002).  
Many attempts have been made to understand this pattern and to untangle the relationship between 
the left-right dimension and support for European integration. Different scholars have reached 
resoundingly different conclusions: that left-right and European integration are orthogonal 
dimensions, that they are fused dimensions, that left-right structures some but not all aspects of 
European integration, or that we need to move beyond the one dimensional left-right framework and 
incorporate conflicts over ‘new politics’ into our models. To a large extent the scholars working on this 
question, perhaps because they work on different substantive aspects of European integration, have 
talked past one another. This article represents the first attempt to analyse competing models of the 
relationship between existing political dimensions and European integration. It finds, contrary to those 
who propose that European integration is an orthogonal political dimension, that party positions on 
European integration are structured by existing political dimensions. Testing different models of this 
relationship shows that a two dimensional (economic left-right and social liberal-conservative) 
conception of political competition provides more explanatory power than a unidimensional ‘general 
left-right’ model. Finally this article proposes that all existing models of the relationship between party 
ideology and party support for European integration have failed to account for one dimension: time. 
Incorporating a time dimension into models of the relationship between party ideology and party 
support for European integration reveals that the relationship has changed considerably over the 
course of European integration – shifting from a situation in which party positions are largely 
determined by attitudes towards economic issues to one in which positions are more strongly 
influenced by stances on social issues.  
 
Existing approaches 
One of the first explorations of the dimensionality of the politics of European integration was provided 
by Hix and Lord, who argued that attitudes to European integration represent an independent political 
dimension, primarily concerned with the question of national sovereignty (Hix 1999; Hix and Lord 
1997). In this approach the national sovereignty dimension is orthogonal to the left-right dimension 
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because they involve fundamentally different questions of resource distribution. The national 
sovereignty dimension involves questions about the distribution of resources between territorial 
groups while the left-right dimension is about the division of resources between functional groups, 
such as social classes.  
Similarly, Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the process of European integration, and the process of 
globalisation more generally, has created new winners and losers in society. European integration has 
created new social cleavages in areas such as protected and unprotected economic sectors, cultural 
competition between natives and migrants, and opponents and supporters of supranational 
governance. These divisions then structure attitudes towards European integration. According to this 
approach, the inverted-U pattern is explained because mainstream political parties have a strategic 
interest in maintaining the dominance of the left-right dimension in political competition and so 
mainstream parties have coalesced around a generally pro-European position. Similarly, but looking 
at the issue from the opposite perspective, Taggart (1998) argued that opposition to European 
integration constitutes a ‘touchstone of dissent’ for radical and extremist parties: an issue they try to 
use as a wedge to gain entry into a party system.  
Other scholars have argued that rather than being a new cleavage, conflict over European Integration 
is structured by existing political cleavages (Marks and Wilson 2000). Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
(2002) argue that the inverted-U shape is slightly misleading. They claim that when fringe political 
parties are eliminated from analysis there is a linear relationship between European integration and 
the left-right dimension, ranging from a pro-integration left to a anti-integration right. Kreppel and 
Tsebelis (1999), and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) go as far as to argue that the European integration 
dimension has become fused with the left-right dimension. These authors argue that debate about 
European integration focuses on whether or not there should be more or less regulation across 
Europe, rather than whether or not integration is a good thing in general. The more-less regulation 
dimension is congruous with the left-right dimension, and so the two are essentially the same. 
Work by Hooghe and Marks (1999) showed that the left-right dimension shapes attitudes towards 
some, but not all, aspects of European integration, particularly policies concerned with redistribution 
and regulating capitalism. Initially Hooghe and Marks (1999) hypothesised that the remaining 
elements of European integration consisted of an orthogonal dimension in much the same way as 
proposed by the earlier Hix and Lord (1997) model. However in later work Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
(2002) came to the conclusion that the remaining aspects of attitudes to European integration can be 
accounted for by positions on a ‘new politics’ dimension which builds on the scholarship that examines 
the rise of political issues concerned with lifestyle, the environment, culture, nationalism and 
immigration (Franklin 1992; Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt 1995; Müller-Rommel 1989).  
Drawing on this work, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) argue that European integration is perceived 
as a direct threat to the principles of those on the ‘traditional-authoritarian-nationalist’ pole of their 
new politics scale: hostility to immigrants, foreign cultures, cosmopolitan elites, and international 
institutions. Conversely, parties on the ‘green-alternative-libertarian’ pole of the new politics scale 
have mixed motivations towards European integration. The EU offers the possibility of enhanced 
cooperation in policy areas such as environmental protection but might also pose a threat to 
democracy and public interest groups.  
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s (2002) new politics theory can potentially explain variation in party 
competition over European integration in different countries. Marks et al. (2006) find that there is a 
geographic divide between western and eastern (post-Soviet) Europe in the pattern of party 
competition of European integration. As a result of different alignments of the left-right dimension 
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and the ‘new politics’ dimension in western and eastern Europe, competition over European issues 
tend to map more readily onto the existing party structures in eastern Europe, while in western 
Europe, European issues are more of a cross cutting issue. The consequence of this is that where 
attitudes to European integration do not align with existing party structures on the left-right and new 
politics dimensions they can act as a potentially volatile electoral issue. 
 
The dimensionality of European political space 
Despite the compelling nature of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s (2002) theory, scholars of European 
politics have failed to reach consensus on the dimensionality of the politics of European integration. 
Whether they have explicitly followed Hooghe, Marks and Wilson or not, many scholars have adopted 
an economic, social, and European integration dimensions approach to the structure of European 
political space (e.g. Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012). Others however, particularly those who study 
decision making within EU bodies such as the European parliament, have for the most part continued 
to use an orthogonal dimensions (left-right, and European integration/national sovereignty) approach 
(e.g. Hix and Høyland 2011; König and Bräuninger 2004; Warntjen, Hix, and Crombez 2008). 
A problem with comparing different theories of the relationship between the left-right dimension and 
European integration (which faces scholars using the left-right concept in all contexts) is that different 
definitions of ‘left-right’ might be used by different scholars. In particular, two definitions of left-right 
are commonly used: The first, a ‘general left-right’ dimension uses left-right to denote a single ‘super’ 
dimension which structures political competition that involves both economic issues (left: government 
control of the economy; right: free market) and social issues (left: socially liberal/progressive; right: 
socially conservative/traditional). The second definition, an ‘economic left-right’ dimension, is only 
concerned with economic issues and social issues are considered to form a second political dimension.  
Ultimately the question of the dimensionality of political space is one that might have different 
answers in different contexts. As Benoit and Laver (2012: 216) put it: 
‘Just as physical maps are spanned by physical dimensions, conceptual maps are spanned by 
conceptual dimensions, which we use to provide substantive orientation. Just as there is not 
one true map, neither is there ‘one true dimensionality’ for any given political setting. 
Sometimes… a one-dimensional map will tell us everything we want to know. Sometimes… it 
will not.’  
It is not hard to see the potential impact of the choice left-right definition has on our understanding 
of the relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European integration. According to the 
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) model, attitudes towards European integration are structured by 
both economic and social attitudes. These effects might be obscured by a more general one 
dimensional conception of left and right – things that occur as a result of changes in social positions 
might be wrongly attributed to economic attitudes. 
Although most scholars are explicit in which conception of left-right they are using, their conceptions 
of the overall dimensional structure of European politics are not always the same, and so arguments 
about the role of ‘left and right’ and European integration may simply be talking past one another. 
Additionally the restrictions of data availability limit the choices researchers are able to make. For 
example Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries (2012) make use of the combined Ray-Chapel Hill Expert survey 
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dataset (Steenbergen and Marks 2007) to test the effect of ideology on party positions towards 
European integration between 1984 and 2006. The scope of their analysis is necessarily restricted to 
a one dimensional approach by the fact that prior to the 1999 survey, the expert surveys only 
measured left-right ideology in the general sense. Similarly Hellström (2008) approaches the question 
of ideology and European integration using the MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2013). Although 
Hellström draws on the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson argument (2002), he is restricted to a one 
dimensional analysis by using a modified version MARPOR’s general left-right RILE scale. 
How much impact these different conceptions of the dimensionality of political space have on our 
assessments of the relationship between ideology and European integration is unclear. In many EU 
member-states the economic and social dimensions are closely aligned, and so the influence of 
dimensionality in those cases may well be minimal. Nonetheless, this is a potentially important issue 
which previous explorations of the relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European 
integration have tended to sidestep or ignore. This is the first potential improvement to existing 
analyses offered by the present approach – the models developed here will be tested using both one 
and two dimensional conceptions of political space. Following Hooghe, Marks and Wilson’s (2002) 
finding that the economic and social dimensions affect attitudes to different aspects of European 
integration, it is expected that because it provides greater explanatory power a two dimensional 
approach will also provide a better fitting statistical model of the relationship between ideology and 
European integration  
Hypothesis 1: A two dimensional conception of ideology will provide a better fitting model of the 
relationship between ideology and attitudes towards European integration.  
 
Ideology and European integration over time 
One dimension that has been neglected by all previous approaches to ideology and European 
integration is how this relationship has changed over time. That this is the case is perhaps surprising 
as even a cursory glance at the history of European integration suggests that European integration is 
not an enduring and amorphous concept. Although it is generally referred to as a single process, the 
reality is that there has not been one European integration: there have been many different European 
integrations. The early stages of integration focused on specific industrial areas: coal and steel, and 
atomic energy. Later economic integration gained a free market focus before the turn to ‘Social 
Europe’ began to affect areas such a labour market regulation. Finally in the last two decades non-
economic areas such as social policy, military cooperation, and foreign policy, have begun to come 
under the remit of European integration as well.  
Similarly, a brief examination of the history of the attitudes of certain political parties towards 
European integration reveals a relationship that changes across time. Much of this change has 
occurred on the left of the political spectrum: many parties on the left were opposed to European 
integration for much of its early history, perceiving it as a capitalist project to spread the free market 
across Europe. However the combination of the shift in European integration towards social policy in 
the late 1980s onwards and the move to a more moderate position by many left wing parties led many 
to a positive reassessment of European integration.  
On the far-left, several west European Communist parties have moved from an openly hostile and 
Eurosceptic position to a positive (if still critical) stance (Charalambous 2013). Similarly many Green 
6 
 
parties have shifted from an anti-integration position to embracing European integration as a platform 
to pursue their policy goals (Bomberg 1998).   
More mainstream left parties have also experienced a large shift in their positions on European 
integration as well. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the British Labour Party (Daniels 1998). 
Labour opposed Britain’s involvement in the early stages of European integration and later became 
bitterly divided over Europe leading to the 1975 referendum and contributing to the 1981 Social 
Democratic Party split. By the time of their victory at the 1997 election however, Labour had embraced 
a wholehearted enthusiasm for Europe. Similarly in Greece, PASOK opposed Greece’s entry to the EEC 
before eventually becoming the mainstream ‘party of Europe’ (before their electoral collapse) 
(Moschonas 2001). 
Any model that does not include some sort of temporal component implicitly assumes that these 
changes can be accounted for by shifts in party ideology rather than changes to the nature of European 
integration. Although such shifts have undoubtedly played some role, changes to the nature of 
European integration suggest that they are unlikely to account for all the shifts in party attitudes 
towards European integration. Specifically two changes are expected to occur over time. First, as 
integration progressed from its ‘common market’ phase to an integrated regulated market, the 
economic ideological structure of attitudes towards European integration is likely to have moved from 
a situation in which attitudes towards European integration became more favourable as parties were 
more right wing (as support for economic liberalisation and free trade increases) to one in which 
attitudes towards European integration are most positive in the centre of the economic dimension 
and more hostile as parties move away from the centre, because they either object to the ‘market’ 
focus of the EU (left pole) or to the burden of EU regulation (right pole):  
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between economic left-right and European integration will 
shift from a left-right/anti-pro integration relationship to a centre-periphery/pro-anti 
integration relationship as European integration progresses. 
Secondly, as European integration has progressed from a functionalist economic project to its 
contemporary form of supranational governance – with competencies ranging from immigration to 
foreign policy cooperation – the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension will 
have shifted from a relationship of centrist support for integration to a relationship marked by an 
increasing division between those who see European integration as a threat to national sovereignty 
and integrity, particularly as a result of migration, and those that support the goal of international 
cooperation as a means of solving political problems: 
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between social liberal-conservative positions and European 
integration will shift from a centre-periphery/pro-anti integration relationship to a liberal-
conservative/pro-anti relationship as European integration progresses.   
In the case of the one dimensional model, where left and liberal, and right and conservative are fused,  
the combination of these two hypotheses will result in a model which shows a shift from an anti-
integration left and a pro-integration right, to a pro-integration left and an anti-integration right. 
Hypothesis 2c: In the one dimensional model the relationship between left and right will shift 





Data and Methodology 
The hypotheses are tested using multi-level mixed effects growth curve modelling approach (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012: 343–349). This method can essentially be understood as a standard multi-
level linear model with a time covariate that is allowed to vary at the level of the unit of interest (i.e. 
random slopes are calculated for the time variable). This method allows longitudinal changes in a 
variable of interest (position towards European integration) to be modelled for each unit of analysis 
(political party). The time variable is measured in years, and is set at 0 for the date on which the Treaty 
of Rome came into effect (1 January 1958). The data is structured using a cross classified approach 
with observations cross classified between political parties and elections, which are nested within 
countries, allowing differences due to party, election, and country effects to be modelled.  
Data is taken from the MARPOR dataset (Volkens et al. 2013). MARPOR data is chosen because it 
allows the widest range of cases, both across time and countries, of any available data source. It also 
allows the Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) theory, which is based on expert survey data, to be tested 
on a new dataset. Policy positions on the general left-right, economic left-right and social liberal-
conservative scales are measured using a comparable set of one and two dimensional scales (Prosser 
2014).1 Each scale is derived by an inductive process that begins from a ‘naïve’ starting scale (based 
on earlier scales). A uniform selection process between scales insures a fair comparison between 
different scales in the analysis, rather than involuntarily comparing different selection methods by 
using scales developed by different means. For more details on the scales used, see the online 
appendix.  
European integration positions are measured on a scale constructed from the two manifesto 
components relating to European integration (108 - European Community: positive, and 110 - 
European Community: negative). Each of the scales are constructed using the Lowe et al.’s (2011) logit 





Where R is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘right’ of the 
scale and L is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘left’. The logit 
scaling method combines the advantages of both additive and ratio scaling methods for manifesto 
data, whilst avoiding the problem of polarisation found in ratio scales, with the additional benefit of 
a diminishing impact of repeated emphasis, mirroring natural language usage (For a more detailed 
account of the advantages and disadvantages of different scaling methods, see Prosser 2014, 91–92).  
For ease of interpretation all scales are rescaled to a 0-100 (left-right/ liberal-conservative/anti-
integration-pro-integration) scale as follows: 
                                                          
1 The one dimensional general left-right scale is slightly modified before analysis: the European Community: positive 
component (108) is included on the left side of the general left-right scale and so to guard against endogeneity problems a 
scale is calculated without this component. As discussed in Prosser (2014), manifesto scales are remarkably robust to the 









In an ideal world the cases included in analysis would be all parties running in all EEC/EC/EU member-
states elections. However as the dataset relies on MARPOR data it is necessarily restricted to the cases 
selected and coded by MARPOR. Unfortunately, at the time of writing three member-states do not 
have any manifestos coded from any relevant elections (Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta, though future 
coding is planned for all three) and several member-states are missing at least one election.3 This 
leaves a total available data pool of 1,238 cases. Manifestos that do not mention European integration 
are excluded, which reduces the total number of cases to 1050.4 Unsurprisingly, given different lengths 
of EU membership and different party system sizes, the cases are not uniformly distributed between 
member-states. The distribution of cases is shown in table 1, along with summary statistics for each 
variable. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Results  
Interclass Correlation Coefficients from an empty multilevel model (results not shown) confirm the 
importance of investigating positions on European integration at the party level. The bulk of the 
variance occurs at the party level (ICC = 0.5), with a much smaller proportion at the country level 
(0.12), and the election level explaining very little ICC =0.03). The analysis of the relationship between 
ideology and European integration positions begins with an examination of the one dimensional 
(general left-right) conception of political ideology, shown in models 1-4 in table 2. Comparing the 
results and fit statistics between models 1 and 2 confirms the importance of modelling the relationship 
between the general left-right dimension and positions on European integration as a curvilinear 
relationship, as suggested by the frequently made ‘inverted U’ observation. Model 1 finds no 
statistically significant relationship between the general left-right scale and party positions on 
European integration, appearing to support the ‘orthogonal’ dimensions interpretation of the 
relationship. However this is no longer the case once a quadratic term is introduced: model 2 finds a 
statistically significant relationship between the general left-right dimension and the European 
integration dimension, with support peaking around the centre of the dimension – replicating the 
traditional ‘inverted U’ pattern of party support for European integration. This supports the argument 
that party positions towards European integration are structured by other political dimensions but are 
not fused with them. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                          
2 The logit scales do not have a natural midpoint or endpoint and so the mean of each scale is subtracted from the scale 
(which gives a midpoint and mean of 50 once rescaled) and in practice the endpoint of each scale approaches ±7, suggesting 
the rescaling formula used here. 
3 In total there are 14 relevant elections that were not coded by MARPOR at the time of writing: Cyprus 2006, 2011; France 
2012; Greece  2004, 2007, 2009, 2012; Latvia 2006, 2010, 2011; Lithuania 2008; Malta 2008; Netherlands 2012; Poland 2011;  
4 As a robustness check the regression models were run with the excluded cases included. Doing so does not affect the 
direction, approximate size, or statistical significance of any of the findings. However in keeping with best practise, the 
‘structural zero’ cases are still excluded from analysis.  
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Model 3 introduces the longitudinal analysis. The statistically significant years and years squared 
coefficient confirms that changes in party positions towards European integration can be modelled as 
a growth curve. Model 4 introduces an interaction between the years variable and the general left-
right variable, which is statistically significant. The fit statistics confirm that this model is superior to 
the other one dimensional models, supporting the argument in favour of introducing temporal 
variation to the relationship between ideology and European integration. The results of model 4, 
illustrated by predictive margins in figure 1 confirm hypothesis 2c: at the early stage of European 
integration positions towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards 
the right of the scale, peaking around the centre right. Fifty years later the model shows the reverse, 
attitudes towards European integration become more favourable as parties move towards the left, 
peaking around the centre left. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The analysis then turns to the two dimensional conception of political space. Model 5 and 6 again 
confirm the curvilinear relationship between left-right and European integration. Model 7 and 8 
examine the relationship between the social liberal-conservative dimension and European integration 
and again confirm that the relationship is curvilinear. Also important to note is that the fit statistics 
between the social and economic dimension models indicates that, on their own, the social dimension 
explains more of the variance in European integration positions than the economic dimension, 
perhaps indicating that the emphasis on left-right in the literature has been misleading. Model 9 
combines the two dimensions and shows that the effects for each dimension are not conditional on a 
party’s position on the other dimension: the coefficients for each dimension are statistically equivalent 
between the individual models (shown in model 6 and 8) and the combined model. Models 10 and 11 
introduce the longitudinal component, which, as with the one dimensional left-right, shows an 
interaction effect between each of the dimensions and the years variable. 
The changing effects of each of the dimensions across time are illustrated by predictive margins in 
figure 2 for economic left-right and figure 3 for social liberal-conservative.5 In both cases the 
relationship changes as suggested in hypotheses 2a and 2b. At the early stage of integration the 
positions on European integration are structured by an anti-integration left and a pro-integration 
right, which by more recent times has shifted towards a relationship that is almost flat, but with peak 
attitudes at the centre of the left-right dimension. The social liberal-conservative dimension on the 
other hand shifts from a relationship where positions on European integration are most positive in the 
centre and are more hostile at each extreme at the early stages of European integration. By the later 
stages of European integration this relationship has shifted to one that has a pro-integration liberal 
end and an anti-integration conservative end.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
                                                          
5 Figures 2 and 3 are two dimensional slices through the three dimensional ideological space analysed here. 
Figure 4 combines these dimensions into a single figure and shows how they fit together.  
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Comparing the fit of the different models reveals a complex set of considerations that must be 
examined when assessing what is ultimately the ‘best’ model of the relationship between ideology 
and European integration. In terms of absolute fit of the model and the data, model 11 produces the 
highest overall R2 value, indicating that the two dimensional ideological model is a better fitting model 
than a one dimensional model, supporting hypothesis one. Also supporting hypothesis one is the 
comparison of the fixed-effects only (the ideology and years variables without any of the country, 
election, and party effects) R2 values between model 4 and 11, showing that the fixed-effects portion 
of model 11 explains more than double the variance of party European integration positions than 
model 4 does.  
The Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics reveal a more 
complicated story. AIC and BIC give an indication of the trade-off between model fit and model 
complexity, with BIC penalising additional model parameters more harshly than AIC. Although the AIC 
statistics indicate that model 11 is to be preferred to model 4, the BIC statistics suggests that the 
improvement in model fit comes at the price of model complexity.  
Similarly although model 11 is the best fitting of the two-dimensional models in absolute terms, both 
the AIC and BIC statistics favour model 10 (which has no interaction between time and ideology) and 
the BIC statistics favour models 8 (the social liberal-conservative only model) and 9 (both ideological 
dimensions without a time variable).  
A possible confounding factor to the analysis here is that the results are driven not by changes in the 
relationship between ideology and positions on European integration over time but by the emergence 
of many small, electorally irrelevant, anti-EU parties. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) show that 
when fringe parties are excluded there is a linear relationship between European integration and the 
left-right dimension. Similarly, van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) show that when observations are 
weighted by their share of the vote the inverted-U shape is much less prominent (though some 
relationship does still exist). In order to test this possibility the final one and two dimensional models 
from table 2 (models 4 and 11) are re-estimated with observations weighted by their share of the 
vote, shown in table 2 of the appendix. The results for each dimension and their interaction with years 
are identical in sign and statistical significance, and the size of the coefficients is very similar, 
suggesting the results are not just being driven by small parties. For both one and two dimensional 
models the model fit statistics suggest that the unweighted models are better models of the 
relationship between ideology and party support for European integration by a considerable margin. 
Interestingly however the weighted model fit statistics show a much stronger distinction between the 
one and two dimensional models than the unweighted models, with the two dimensional model 
clearly outperforming the one dimensional model.  
There is no final answer to the question of which of the models is the ‘best’ model – ultimately it 
depends on the research purpose of the model. Here the goal is not just to model the relationship 
between ideology and positions on European integration but to understand what factors influence 
that relationship (i.e. one vs two dimensions) and how that relationship has changes across time. For 
these purposes the statistical significance of the variables is more important than overall assessments 
of model performance. For other purposes the same may not be true: if the goal is simply to control 
for the effects of ideology as part of a wider model then the results here indicate that various 
formulations of ideology as a one or two dimensional construct and with and without an interaction 




East, West, and the importance of time 
There are two main findings from the preceding analysis: One, the two dimensional (economic left-
right and social liberal conservative) approach generally offers better model fit and greater 
explanatory power than the one dimensional (general left-right) approach. This finding also essentially 
replicates the earlier Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) model with a dataset that is drawn from a 
different source (expert surveys vs manifesto data) and covers a wider timespan than the original 
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson model. Two, the relationship between the ideological dimensions and 
positions on European integration has changed considerably over time 
The importance of taking the dimensionality of the relationship between ideology and European 
integration – particularly the role of the temporal dimension – seriously, and how failing to do so can 
lead to incorrect inferences, is easily illustrated by a comparison of parties in Western and Eastern 
Europe.  
That party competition in Western and European Eastern Europe is structured differently is well 
established, with competition in the West being dominated by the economic dimension, whilst there 
is more emphasis on social issues in the East (Coman 2015). The origins of Western European party 
systems lie in shared historical developments, such as the industrial revolution and the rise of mass 
democracy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rueschemeyer 1992), and 
developed along similar lines during the post-industrial era (Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994). The much 
younger Eastern European party systems developed rapidly during the transition from Soviet rule and 
are characterised by a greater emphasis on ethnicity, religion, and region rather than socio-economic 
class conflict (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Markowski 1997; Evans and Whitefield 1998; Whitefield 
2002; Grzymala-Busse 2006; Rovny 2014).  
Despite the fundamental differences in the structure of political competition in Western and Eastern 
Europe, Marks et al. (2006) find that the relationship between the economic and social dimensions 
and European integration positions is fundamentally the same. To test this result with different 
conceptions of dimensionality a binary variable that measures whether a country is an Eastern 
European former Soviet state (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) is added to the previous models and interacted with the ideological dimension 
variables. As the multi-level model already controls for country level variance in European integration 
positions, this variable measures whether there is anything specifically ‘Eastern European’ or ‘Post 
Soviet’ in the relationship between ideology and European integration positions in these countries. 
The results of these models are shown in table 3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The results from model 12 show that using a linear general left-right dimension, there is a significant 
interaction between left-right and Eastern Europe, with the model suggesting that Eastern European 
parties are much more pro-integration than Western parties, and that in Western Europe the 
relationship between left-right and European integration is essentially flat whilst in Eastern Europe 
the left is more pro integration than the right. Model 13 introduces the squared general left-right term 
and shows that parties in Western Europe conform to the ‘inverted u’ pattern whilst left and centre-
left parties in Eastern Europe are broadly pro-integration whilst those of right of centre are less so. 
Model 14 reintroduces the time variable and the interaction with general left-right. Once differences 
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due to time are accounted for, the apparent difference between Western and Eastern European 
parties diminishes and is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the apparent difference 
between East and West found in the earlier model is in fact due to differences between past and 
present positions held by Western parties.  
Models 15-17 repeat the analysis for the two dimensional conception of dimensionality, a more direct 
replication of the Marks et al. (2006) analysis. Models 14 and 15 both show that Eastern parties are 
more pro-integration than Western parties and that there is a statistically significant interaction 
between Eastern Europe and economic left-right. Again however, as shown in model 17, when the 
time component of the model is included, the apparent Eastern European effects disappear.  
The original Marks et al. (2006) model did not include a time component in their analysis, but as it was 
based on more temporarily limited expert survey data this did not confound their results. A direct 
replication of their analysis on a dataset with a wider range of cases (i.e. model 16) would lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that there was a significant difference between the underlying relationship 
between ideology and European integration. Accounting for time however confirms the validity of the 
original Marks et al. finding – despite the different structural dimensionality of politics in Eastern and 
Western Europe, the relationship between the economic and social dimensions, and European 
integration is fundamentally the same.  
Discussion and conclusion 
One important implication of the results here is the understanding of how the way in which ideology 
structures attitudes towards European integration has changed over time. This is not simply a 
reiteration of the fact that there are longitudinal differences in the relationship between each 
dimension and positions on European integration – it is important to understand what we learn from 
the combination of the longitudinal approach with the two dimensional approach. The one 
dimensional general left-right approach models the data almost as well as the two dimensional 
approach, but the aggregation of economic and social preferences misses one of the key changes that 
is revealed by the two dimensional approach. Combining both dimensions, as shown in figure 4, 
reveals an important shift in the relationship between ideology and European integration.6 In the early 
stages, as illustrated for 1958, attitudes towards European integration were primarily structured by 
the economic left-right dimension with social liberal-conservative positions only influencing positions 
within the range determined by economic left-right: the slope with the steepest gradient occurs along 
the economic left-right axis. Fifty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome this situation had 
reversed: attitudes towards European integration are now primarily structured by the social liberal-
conservative dimension, with economic policy distance shifting positions towards integration within 
the bounds determined by the social dimension: the steepest gradient of the graph is now along the 
social liberal-conservative axis. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
                                                          
6 For reasons of clarity figure 4 does not include confidence intervals (which would be very difficult to show 
clearly in a three dimensional figure). However figure 4 is essentially a combination of the predictive margins 
shown in figure 2 and 3 (that include the confidence intervals for each dimension), which shows that the 
difference in slopes between years is statistically significant for both dimensions.  
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The end result of this change is broadly captured by the general left-right models (as shown in figure 
1) but it would be impossible to disentangle the underlying change using a one dimensional approach, 
and it would be too easy to assume that attitudes towards economic aspects that tend to dominate 
our understanding of left-right, such as redistribution, are also the primary driver in the change in the 
relationship between the general left-right dimension and European integration. This conclusion 
would be entirely wrong. It is hard to overstate the importance of the social dimension in structuring 
attitudes towards European integration, a finding which differs considerably from most approaches 
to this topic which have tended to emphasise left and right. Although economic left-right certainly 
appears to be more important than the social dimension in the early stages of integration and 
continues to play a small but significant role, in the contemporary world social liberal-conservative 
attitudes are much more important.  
This finding aligns with much recent research on the role of factors such as hostility to immigration 
and authoritarianism – which fit within the conservative side of the social dimension – play in 
structuring citizen hostility towards European integration (McLaren 2002; Tillman 2013; Vreese, 
Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008). That the same can be said for political parties is probably of little 
surprise to even casual observers of European politics. In this respect, the analysis here has simply 
brought empirical models of party ideology and European integration into line with more general 
observations.  
The analysis here also points to an important methodological consideration with implications for 
political science beyond the study of European integration. ‘Left-right’ is possibly one of the most 
widely used concepts in all areas of politics, from its academic study to popular discourse. It is also a 
term that is inherently ambiguous – there can be no definitive answer to the question of whether left-
right ‘really’ means a general catch-all super dimension that covers economic and social policy 
preferences, just economic preferences, or something else entirely. Comparing the models which 
alternatively use left-right as a general catch-all dimension and as an economic dimension shows how 
easy it would be to draw erroneous conclusions about the role of economic and social preferences in 
structuring party behaviour.     
The results also illustrate the importance of testing for nonlinear relationships. In both the one and 
two dimensional models the simply linear relationship between left-right and attitudes towards 
European integration (models 1 and 5) is statistically insignificant. Whilst further testing reveals that 
a squared left-right term is important in both cases, if the analysis was halted at the linear stage, a 
very different conclusion would be reached about the relationship between left-right and European 
integration: that there is no link between left-right attitudes to European integration. This is a 
conclusion that has previously been suggested in the literature but which is demonstrably incorrect. 
Of course, the structuring role of ideology is only one determinant of party positions on European 
integration. Other factors, from concerns particular to individual countries, participation in 
government, and electoral expediency – all of which have been identified in the literature – also play 
an important role in shaping the positions that parties take on European integration. The analysis here 
does not deny the importance of these factors, but has set them to one side in order to concentrate 
on long term shifts in the structure of party attitudes to European integration. Ideology may not be 
the only cause of the positions parties take on European integration but by structuring party attitudes 
to integration it influences the attractiveness of different strategic options – whether to shift, 
emphasise, or hide their position on European integration. The way ideology has performed this role 
has changed dramatically over the course of European integration. Undoubtedly, as the integration 
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Social liberal - 
conservative 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (Excluded) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) 
Austria 
24 55.66 47.091 43.021 55.795 
(1) (15.849) (10.484) (12.083) (7.244) 
Belgium 
143 63.615 45.534 47.341 44.937 
(11) (9.008) (8.258) (10.73) (9.339) 
Bulgaria 
3 59.96 55.163 58.5 62.224 
(3) (7.913) (2.858) (2.561) (4.487) 
Czech Republic 
11 61.95 47.881 50.493 35.924 
(1) (9.405) (4.727) (8.044) (8.595) 
Denmark 
82 40.881 49.778 50.585 49.558 
(61) (15.024) (12.251) (13.227) (11.096) 
Estonia 
12 60.822 48.301 36.353 53.9 
(0) (8.025) (6.447) (8.852) (7.851) 
Finland 
28 48.851 49.64 48.214 51.685 
(13) (14.547) (8.452) (9.823) (9.326) 
France 
63 52.023 47.588 46.921 48.776 
(21) (14.191) (11.435) (12.59) (10.358) 
Germany 
62 59.752 46.376 48.59 48.227 
(4) (8.034) (9.352) (10.123) (9.402) 
Great Britain 
44 52.108 47.273 48.059 48.916 
(0) (14.719) (7.459) (9.631) (11.908) 
Greece 
28 50.969 50.095 44.447 55.814 
(1) (18.701) (7.977) (11.591) (10.98) 
Hungary 
11 63.193 50.26 45.55 53.355 
(1) (10.486) (4.513) (6.558) (6.537) 
Ireland 
44 50.661 43.657 43.584 47.047 
(15) (13.257) (9.28) (11.535) (12.065) 
Italy 
114 60.587 47.621 51.437 51.151 
(28) (13.177) (9.531) (10.535) (11.722) 
Lithuania 
6 56.381 43.828 37.403 51.673 
(0) (11.308) (9.406) (12.451) (5.198) 
Luxembourg 
50 52.67 42.153 42.714 40.328 
(7) (17.647) (11.564) (11.515) (11.227) 
Netherlands 
109 58.84 47.633 49.955 43.779 
(4) (12.229) (9.004) (8.455) (10.359) 
Poland 
10 54.923 45.936 39.503 55.148 
(2) (15.648) (8.886) (9.286) (6.58) 
Portugal 
46 49.319 42.947 42.326 52.629 
(5) (17.43) (7.165) (10.209) (7.631) 
Romania 
4 58.94 45.225 43.135 53.548 
(0) (5.708) (6.05) (11.641) (7.387) 
Slovakia 
21 57.335 52.756 53.229 50.702 
(0) (15.889) (7.856) (10.027) (8.195) 
Slovenia 
25 60.155 47.329 49.313 50.367 
(0) (13.628) (3.906) (4.312) (6.966) 
Spain 
84 61.498 36.628 39.98 38.882 
(5) (15) (10.482) (11.533) (9.172) 
Sweden 
26 50.072 45.903 47.538 37.24 
(3) (18.835) (12.693) (12.985) (10.983) 
Total 
1050 56.087 46.079 46.993 47.252 
(188) (14.988) (10.034) (11.331) (11.138) 
TABLE 1.  DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BETWEEN MEMBER-STATES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE 





 One dimensional Two dimensional 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
General left-right 
-0.054 0.891*** 0.750*** 1.309***        
(0.047) (0.202) (0.195) (0.231)        
General left-right squared 
 -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.014***        
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)        
General left-right X 
Years interaction 
   -0.012***        
   (0.003)        
Economic left-right 
    0.049 0.493***   0.499*** 0.408** 0.748*** 
    (0.041) (0.17)   (0.166) (0.162) (0.21) 
Economic left-right squared 
     -0.005***   -0.004** -0.003* -0.005*** 
     (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Economic left-right X 
Years interaction 
          -0.005** 
          (0.002) 
Social liberal-conservative 
      -0.155*** 0.826*** 0.873*** 0.821*** 1.01*** 
      (0.036) (0.174) (0.175) (0.168) (0.181) 
Social liberal-conservative 
squared 
       -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.01*** 
       (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Social liberal-conservative X 
Years interaction 
          -0.009*** 
          (0.002) 
Years 
  0.283*** 0.911***      0.287*** 1.005** 
  (0.102) (0.177)      (0.104) (0.19) 
Years squared 
  -0.003** -0.004**      -0.003 -0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002)      (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
57.141*** 38.346*** 35.268*** 13.102* 52.368*** 43.151*** 62.164*** 41.637*** 27.676*** 24.343*** 0.591 
(2.609) (4.665) (4.798) (6.949) (2.344) (4.141) (2.236) (4.19) (5.658) (5.773) (7.857) 
N 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 
Overall R2 0.74 0.74 0.785 0.787 0.743 0.741 0.741 0.756 0.758 0.793 0.797 
Fixed effects only R2 <0.001 0.056 0.036 0.043 0.018 0.055 0.03 0.062 0.117 0.102 0.104 
AIC 8111.796 8101.678 8076.784 8070.103 8112.028 8117.682 8095.547 8076.327 8081.996 8054.83 8057.807 
BIC 8141.536 8136.374 8126.35 8124.625 8141.767 8152.378 8125.286 8111.023 8126.605 8114.309 8127.198 
Statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
TABLE 2. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT AND SOCIAL LIBERAL-





 One dimensional Two dimensional 
  Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
General left-right -0.0343    0.861*** 1.294***    
 (0.0484)    (0.202)    (0.235)       
General left-right squared  -0.0106*** -0.0112***    
  (0.00233)    (0.00229)       
General left-right X   -0.0119***    
Years interaction   (0.00284)       
Economic left-right    0.101**  0.522*** 0.718*** 
    (0.0429)    (0.166)    (0.212)    
Economic left-right squared     -0.00422**  -0.00490*** 
     (0.00181)    (0.00187)    
Economic left-right X      -0.00476*   
Years interaction      (0.00260)    
Social liberal-conservative    -0.169*** 0.871*** 1.038*** 
    (0.0377)    (0.175)    (0.183)    
Social liberal-conservative squared     -0.0117*** -0.0101*** 
     (0.00191)    (0.00185)    
Social liberal-conservative X      -0.00948*** 
 Years interaction      (0.00251)    
Eastern Europe 31.54*** 26.25**  13.12    25.32**  23.45**  8.162    
 (11.23)    (11.09)    (11.88)    (11.61)    (11.31)    (11.91)    
Eastern Europe X -0.514**  -0.414*   -0.131       
general left-right Interaction (0.224)    (0.221)    (0.238)       
Eastern Europe X    -0.284*   -0.308**  -0.174    
Economic left-right Interaction    (0.161)    (0.157)    (0.171)    
Eastern Europe X    -0.103    -0.0502    0.122    
Social liberal-conservative Interaction    (0.167)    (0.163)    (0.174)    
Years   0.917***   1.009*** 
   (0.181)      (0.195)    
Years squared   -0.00487***   -0.00374**  
   (0.00171)      (0.00178)    
Constant 54.30*** 36.75*** 11.88*   56.20*** 24.89*** -0.835    
  (2.723)    (4.684)    (7.100)    (2.875)    (5.690)    (7.945)    
N 1050    1050    1050    1050    1050    1050    
TABLE 3. RESULTS FROM MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS LINEAR MODELS ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT, ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT, SOCIAL LIBERAL-





FIGURE 1. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON 
THE GENERAL LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION IN 1958 AND 2008. 
 
FIGURE 2. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON 
THE ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION WITH SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, 




FIGURE 3. PREDICTED PARTY POSITIONS TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS AN EFFECT OF POSITIONS ON 
THE SOCIAL LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE DIMENSION WITH ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT HELD AT THE SAMPLE MEAN, 











Appendix to Dimensionality, ideology and party positions towards European integration 
Manifesto components used in each of the dimensional scales and the distribution of the scales in the 
dataset. For more information on the scales, see Prosser (2014) “Building Policy Scales from 
Manifesto Data: A Referential Content Validity Approach.” Electoral Studies 35: 88–101. 
 
General left-right 
General left-right scale 
Left Right 
105 Military: Negative 109 Internationalism: Negative 
106 Peace 401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
107 Internationalism: Positive 407 Protectionism: Negative 
202 Democracy 414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 
301 Decentralisation 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive 
303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 507 Education Limitation: Positive 
403 Market Regulation: Positive 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
408 Economic Goals 603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
411 Technology and Infrastructure 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 702 Labour Groups: Negative 
413 Nationalisation: Positive   
416 Anti-Growth Economy   
501 Environmental Protection   
502 Culture   
503 Social Justice   
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive   
506 Education Expansion: Positive   
602 National Way of Life: Negative   
604 Traditional Morality: Negative   
701 Labour Groups: Positive   
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups   
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups     
Table 1. Manifesto components included in the general left-right scale. 
 
 























403 Market Regulation: Positive 401 Free Enterprise: Positive 
411 Technology and Infrastructure 407 Protectionism: Negative 
412 Controlled Economy: Positive 414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive 
413 Nationalisation: Positive 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive 
503 Social Justice 507 Education Limitation: Positive 
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive 702 Labour Groups: Negative 
506 Education Expansion: Positive   
701 Labour Groups: Positive     
Social Liberal-Conservative 
Liberal Conservative 
105 Military: Negative 109 Internationalism: Negative 
106 Peace 302 Centralisation 
107 Internationalism: Positive 305 Political Authority: Positive 
201 Freedom and Human Rights 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
202 Democracy 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
301 Decentralisation   
416 Anti-Growth Economy   
501 Environmental Protection   
502 Culture   
602 National Way of Life: Negative   
607 Multiculturalism: Positive   
704 Middle Class and Professional Groups   
705 Underprivileged Minority Groups   
706 Non-economic Demographic Groups     


































































Robustness check – weighting by party vote share 
Table 2 shows the final one and two dimensional models from table 2 (models 4 and 11) re-estimated 
with observations weighted by their share of the vote, as a robustness check against the possibility 
that the results are being driven by small and electorally irrelevant parties. The results show that the 
original results are robust to the weighting of the data. 
  One dimensional Two dimensional 
General left-right 1.827***                 
 (0.459)                 
General left-right squared -0.0176***                 
 (0.00379)                 
General left-right X Years interaction -0.0145**                 
 (0.00672)                 
Economic left-right  1.227*** 
  (0.362)    
Economic left-right squared  -0.00987*** 
  (0.00278)    
Economic left-right X Years interaction  -0.0115**  
  (0.00582)    
Social liberal-conservative  1.022*** 
  (0.368)    
Social liberal-conservative squared  -0.0106*** 
  (0.00321)    
Social liberal-conservative X Years interaction  -0.00683*** 
  (0.00230)    
Years 1.192*** 1.316*** 
 (0.360) (0.297)    
Years squared -0.00624* -0.00479    
 (0.00358) (0.00347)    
Constant 0.450 -11.75    
 (13.97) (14.18)    
N 1049    1049    
Overall R2 0.849 0.849 
Fixed effects only R2 0.037 0.058 
AIC 95207.78 94752.29 
BIC 95262.29 94816.71 
Table 2. Final one and two dimensional models (models 4 and 11 of table 2 of Dimensionality, 
ideology and party positions towards European integration) re-estimated with observations 
weighted by party vote share. 
 
